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SOUTH AFRICA, SOUTHERN AFRICA and BEYOND: 
Explorations Toward Regional Integration
Reginald Herbold Green
No man is an island...
Ask not for whom the bell tolls,
It tolls for thee.
- John Donne
Markets are social constructs 
embedded in...shaped... and sustained 
by societies... What is rational in one 
society may be irrational in another.
- David Marquand
P r o l e g o m e n o n  R e v is it e d
In 1991 at the African Leadership Forum pre-transition workshop on Southern African 
regionalism the present author suggested a framework of propositions about context and 
process. It is, perhaps, appropriate to revisit those propositions to see how relevant they have 
been:
1. the South African economy was a very sick one even in Sub-Saharan African terms;
2. a legitimate government could regain 4% annual growth, but because redistribution and 
transformation (including livelihood creation) needed to be largely out o f additional output 
an 8% growth trend was needed for sustained stability;
3. therefore South Africa could not be a locomotive of growth for Southern Africa and SSA 
more broadly by conventional methods and especially not through massive outward 
investment or foreign aid;
4. this might mean that South Africa would become both more inward looking (e.g. in 
respect to migrant labour) and more globalist (downplaying the relatively small and poor
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Southern African sub-region) albeit that was not inevitable and the historic relationships of 
the ANC with the Front line States and SADC might have an opposite impact;
5. the old South-Southern African exchange of migrant labour plus hard currency for - often 
overpriced - manufactured goods plus food was increasingly unviable and unacceptable to 
both parties;
6. but substantial opportunities for less hegemonic exchange patterns (including transport, 
power and water as well as visible goods) existed and could be useful to strengthening all 
o f the South/Southern African economies;
7. a particular problem inherited from apartheid was South Africa's relatively low labour 
productivity in manufacturing - a result o f highly combative industrial relations turning on 
systemic conflict and thus severing the normal real wage/productivity linkage;
8. to overcome that barrier would require altered thinking not merely at governmental, top 
management and national labour leader level but also - which would be more difficult - at 
shop floor foremen and shop steward level perceptions and interactions;
9. SADC - because o f its deeper multi sectoral approach and concentration on mutually 
perceived common interests (as well as its FLS links) would prove more attractive to 
South Africa and more able to accommodate it within its structures and dynamics than 
would COMESA/EAPTA (Eastern and Southern African economic 
community/preferential trade area) albeit a case for a division of labour between SADC 
and COMESA existed and might be furthered by South African participation in both.
To date, these propositions - which were by no means conventional wisdom in 1992 - have
stood the test o f events. The one significant alteration needed is that South Africa (at
enterprise as well as governmental level) has given a higher priority to African relations -
economic and other - and especially to those with its sub-region than seemed probable in
1992.
Fr o m  S o u t h  A f r ic a  T o  T h e  G l o b e : S o u t h  A f r ic a n  In t e r e s t s
This paper is built on the principle o f concentric circles; South Africa, Southern Africa, 
Africa, The Globe. This is heuristically simple but has a substantive rationale as well.
First, successful, sustainable regional integration must rest on perceived common interests 
among members - beginning with the national interests o f each.
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Second, practicable scope for integration is likely to be greater among a relatively limited 
number o f relatively like-minded countries - for South Africa, therefore, Southern Africa.
Over time, any grouping may expand as has the EU, and in economic size SADC even more 
dramatically.
Third, what is achieved nationally and sub-regionally will affect what can be achieved 
regionally and globally. Africa's current low international standing rests on economic 
weakness, perceived mal-governance and lack o f coherent, analytically defended strategic 
proposals. South Africa can be more effective if it speaks as a leader within SADC and if both 
it and the SADC states as a group have improving economic and governance records and 
more incisive, better argued strategic proposals and negotiating positions.
South Africa's outward concerns arise from a series o f structural national goals and problems:
1. Acceptance o f the basic moral economy proposition o f Adam Smith that no nation can be 
great and prosperous the majority of whose people are poor and miserable and that it is 
imperative for the state to create a context in which they can escape from those conditions;
2. Leading (given constraints on redistribution) to an absolute need for a 6% to 8% growth 
trend of total available resources since redressing inequality out o f added resources is very 
much cosier than taking away from existing allocations;
3. Which implies a need for 7% to 9% of exports of goods and services to meet the import 
requirements o f 6% to 8% growth;
4. With the key established export market for manufactures (beyond a rather narrow 
traditional band) being the SACUA and broader SADC grouping, and the most promising 
expansion area potentially SSA more generally because in many cases SA will not face 
first rate competition and because SSA appears in general to pay 20% above standard 
prices for many (perhaps most) o f its imports;
5. And a parallel need to expand sourcing from the region - in many cases valid on micro 
economic grounds and more generally needed because a sustained 10% rise in regional 
exports is impossible unless imports rise even faster to erode regional export present 
dependence on migrant labour (unwanted) and hard currency (unavailable) payments;
6. Leading to parallel concern with regional transport both to facilitate trade and because 
economic (and pre-1975 historical in the case o f Maputo) logic mean that Maputo and 
Walvis Bay should be key regional and global trade ports for South Africa;
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7. The hard reality that water and food are increasing sources o f sub-regional insecurity and 
conflict which can be averted only by a sub-regional strategy going to causes a well as 
symptoms;
8. South Africa's desire to regain its potential position as a respected, influential "middle 
power" which for historic and avoidance of jealousy reasons is likely to be smoother and 
greater as a leading member o f Southern African and African groupings;
9. A perceived vocation for furthering good governance both in the sub-region and 
continentally.
In general South African social sector bodies and enterprises share many of these concerns 
and perceptions. Outward mindedness has a relatively deep and wide base rather than being 
the private terrain o f a handful o f academicians, businessmen, public servants and rhetoricians.
These are in fact very substantial reasons for South Africa to seek integration - especially, but 
not only, sub-regionally. One problem is the result of South Africa's disproportionate 
economic size and military strength exacerbated by its history o f hegemonic aspirations.
South Africa - like Germany in the EU - always needs to be on its guard not to push too hard 
and above all not to be seen by its partners as coercive and domineering. Equally, it must face 
the realities that its partners will in some cases at least expect more o f it than South Africa can 
deliver and that in areas o f genuine, unavoidable conflict o f interests - e.g. water right 
allocation with Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Botswana - it has 
to fight its corner and make a reasoned case even while avoiding the perception o f bullying or 
of refusing to accept that it too must make changes. To date it would be fair to say it has 
usually been well aware o f these dangers and sought to limit them.
The changes in perceptions and stance since 1989 are dramatic. This is not simply a matter of 
the end of apartheid. The ancien regime had begun a rather patchy process of change in 1990 
- the "forward strategy" to make Southern Africa safe and profitable for apartheid died by 
1991. Further, at the turn o f the decade many o f the most verbal radical South African 
academics appalled Southern Africans by suggesting the new South Africa should be as 
hegemonic and bluntly interventionist as the old - even if for different reasons and for 
neighbour states' peoples' "own good" as defined in South Africa. Finally, while regional 
issues were on most agendas, it was not clear how high they were - an inward looking strategy 
focused almost entirely on domestic problems and a trade strategy looking beyond Africa did 
seem only too likely.
The ANC - which never adumbrated a counter-hegemonic policy in respect to the region - has 
in fact placed African - and especially sub-regional - issues high on its agenda. In part this
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relates to its historic close and - on balance - cordial and useful relationships with the Front 
Line States and - more peripherally SADC. However, it also flows from participation of 
senior politicians and officials in a series o f workshops and conferences to explore regional 
integration and from substantial articulated homework. Highlighting water, labour, finance, 
cross-border economic zones on transport corridors and a broadened definition o f security 
(including root causes in food, water and livelihood insecurity) are not proposals flowing 
simply from historic friendships or emotional solidarity, important as these have been in 
context setting and perhaps, in the decision to opt for SADC over COMESA. Hard-headed, 
analysed national interests related to potential for mutual interests and potentially acceptable 
divisions o f gains and cost are evident.
E c o n o m ic  In t e g r a t io n  a n d  P o l it ic a l  E c o n o m ic  R e g io n a l is m
The case for economic integration in Sub-Saharan Africa has been repetitively rehearsed at 
academic, governmental, inter-governmental institution and conference levels for at least four 
decades (rather longer including the cross territorial colonial era variants and the 1920 onward 
South African drive for outward looking regional pre-eminence). It is not an area of left-right, 
state-enterprise, black-white divides. Enterprise approaches to the issues are narrower and 
more micro specific, but South African enterprises and enterprise groups do see regional and 
continental exports, investments and -perhaps - sources as crucial while the Lusaka 
Declaration attack on the existing economic integration pattern was an attack on hegemonic 
domination - especially when used as part o f a total strategy to make Southern Africa safe and 
profitable for apartheid - and the regionalist goals it spelled out in no way excluded 
participation by a transformed South Africa any more than by an independent Namibia.
The case for integration has - up to a point - been accepted politically; declarations, treaties 
and organisations have proliferated for thirty years. Real resources - not least political 
decision taker and high level public servant time - have been devoted to negotiating, running, 
reviewing and reviving regional and sub-regional cooperation, coordination and integration.
However, the overall results are meagre. Regionalism is -with limited exceptions - not at 
the centre of national or of enterprise strategic planning, policy formulation or day to 
day decision taking. Its disappearance from the press between conferences (except to a 
degree in Southern and parts of Eastern Africa) is in large measure a reflection o f its low 
profile in the ongoing work of governments and businesses. Why?
The argument that imported, unadapted theories and applications - including treaties - 
have often been inappropriate is valid. ECA's love affair with the EEC model and - slightly
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inconsistently - free trade areas has hindered the effectiveness of its heroic efforts over three 
decades to make economic integration a rallying cry leading into a movement to a reality. But 
the problems o f inappropriate imports and of ill-adapted technologies is hardly unique to 
economic or political economic regionalism.
The failure to analyse two inherent areas of tension - state/regional and state/enterprise -
which may be creative or, especially when not directly examined, destructive, has been more 
damaging. A laissezfaire common market and even moderately interventionist national state 
will come into conflict. If no mechanisms are set up to manage these conflicts they will 
inevitably sap the vitality o f regionalism - no African integration group secretariat can take on 
its member states on a we/they basis and win even if some have tried. Similarly, many 
attempted integration processes have paid scant attention to enterprise views, concerns and 
knowledge. Given that most economic relationships - and especially trade and production o f 
tradables - are in the enterprise sector this is a serious gap. Filling it is not helped by the 
tendency of enterprises to treat regional fora as opportunities to promote common tax and 
regulatory concessions rather more than to provide contributions toward strengthening 
regional economic dynamics and on reflecting what state actions would facilitate enterprise 
participation in them.
In addition, tensions exist within governments and poor state-enterprise communication 
is endemic. They are more serious on the multi-country scene, but are only rarely the chief 
cause of failure or stagnation.
Unrealistic goals and nominal programmes have been a greater problem regionally than 
nationally with the partial, but noteworthy, exception o f SADC/SADCC. Unrealism here 
includes adding so many areas (perhaps because core ones are stagnant) that prioritisation is 
lost in and constructing totally artificial time tables (as in the 1980 Act o f Lagos and 1990 
Abuja Common Market Treaty) with no mechanisms for stage by stage monitoring and review 
let alone actual articulated implementation.
This weakness is an aspect o f a deeper one - inadequate operational involvement of states
in integration attempts, again with SADCC/SADC an exception One aspect is a plethora o f 
secretariat policy, project and resolution proposals drawn up with little consultation with 
member states, distributed too late for domestic analysis and review, approved too rapidly 
with too little opportunity for revision and - predictably - thereafter more prone to collecting 
dust than to generating dynamic, concerted implementation. The former East African 
Community and - even more acutely - ECOWAS and COMESA/EAPTA - have been 
hamstrung by these patterns o f operation.
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State patterns of handling regionalism frequently reinforce weaknesses of operational 
involvements. At worst there is no ongoing focus point anywhere in government - only an 
intermittent conference preparation function. At best, participation in inter ministerial 
committees to prepare, report back, monitor progress is spotty and often poorly linked to key 
ministry planning and operational functions. This is compounded when there are few or no 
regional sectoral technical and programming meetings providing a focus, an output and an 
incentive for domestic ministerial attention.
To argue for a regional impact assessment on all major policies, programmes and 
projects ex ante and ex post sounds grandiose and is impracticable if a full scale consultancy 
type study is envisaged. However, if it means regional impact like environmental, fiscal, 
gender, external balance, poverty, food security should be on a check list for explicit attention 
within known national policy guideline parameters, it is basic to making the most o f regional 
opportunities and reducing needless frictions with partners.
History is a further embrangling factor This is not primarily because economic 
coordination was in some cases practised by colonial powers, but because in West Africa that 
history has - together with ECOWAS weakness - both perpetuated a Francophone sub­
grouping and led to Anglophone suspicions as to its role, while in both Eastern and Southern 
Africa it has led to grave suspicions that centralising tendencies in regionalism (whether 
'natural' or manipulated) weaken poorer members and - per contra - belief by richer members 
that their treasuries are overburdened by partial compensatory measures, even if the limited 
empirical analyses done to date suggest that the former proposition can readily be overstated 
and that the latter is incorrect.
Three specific historic problems confront Southern Africa. First, the South Africa centred de 
facto  sub-region and its more formal customs and monetary unions have historically been 
unequally beneficial in favour of South Africa (a situation white Rhodesia objected to as 
much as Zimbabwe). The goodwill arising from cooperation in achieving the new South 
Africa and the clear statement that regionalism must be based on mutual interest o f the present 
South African government have gone far toward eroding this barrier. Second, the history of 
Rhodesias-Nyasaland and East African economic cooperation as centralised, hegemonic 
and periphery draining has made several SADC members ultra cautious in respect to strong 
supranational or even transnational structures and especially to joint ventures, joint borrowing 
and fiscal transfers as modalities of cooperation. To date, S ADC's success using other 
modalities has helped erode this historical barrier.
EAPTA/COMESA-SADC/SADCC animosity is a more serious problem EC A and its
child PTA, felt SADCC was a distraction or a foreign dominated spoiler and for some years 
said so in no uncertain terms. SADCC - up to and including Heads o f State level - became
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incensed and suspicious, embrangling attempts at coordination and division of labour. 
COMESA/PTA's ill-advised efforts to take over SADCC/SADC and to denigrate it, while in 
many areas having far less achievements to show, has further complicated matters and 
embittered individuals.
All o f the above factors - and especially the inadequate national integration of regionalism 
into domestic priority pursuit on an ongoing basis and the historic conflicts - have 
weakened regional initiatives and processes. But even together they do not explain its poor 
record. National sectors facing similar challenges have more frequently overcome them.
Why?
The answers appear to be political economic and - occasionally - pure political not technical 
economic:
1 domestic policy and programme decisions are unavoidable - regional ones can 
usually be deferred almost ad infinitum;
2. governments are unlikely to be overthrown or to lose (or win) elections on regional 
results;
3. free trade areas have no political sex appeal - employment, food security, exports, 
poverty reduction, livelihoods (and projects seen to create them) do - and if regional free 
trade is presented in ways apparently conflicting with or irrelevant to these more concrete 
goals it is sure to lose out or to be given low priority;
4. a multitude of inter country conflicts (even totally beyond economic regionalism) will 
be a severe obstacle to dynamic economic regionalism and in extreme cases (Apartheid 
South Africa/S ADC and Idi Amin's Uganda/Tanzania) makes serious economic regional 
dialogue and practice nearly or totally impracticable;
5. abstract formulations of economic regionalism limited to free trade and excluding 
political economy both hide the opportunities and cloud the requirements o f operating 
on the basis o f mutually perceived common interests best or only pursued in common
and embracing - e.g. - food security, regional security broadly defined, power production 
and distribution, animal agricultural research and disease control just as much as customs 
and exchange control barrier reduction and regulation harmonisation and simplification. 
Only states can select the necessary minimum and maximum scope for dynamic 
regionalism - professionals can at best advise - and the way to add crucial but initially 
difficult areas (e.g. cross-border water rights in the case of the SADC region) is usually to 
set them to one side until a habit of cooperation and of finding mutually beneficial policies
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and programmes in 'easier' areas has been built up (e.g. transport, communication, crop 
research, food security in SADC) not to see their initial inclusion as a make or break issue.
R e g i o n a l  D y n a m ic s  in  S o u t h e r n  A f r i c a :  1990-2005
Sub-regional integration has taken a higher position on both government and enterprise 
agendas in South Africa in the last two years than might have been expected. The reasons 
appear in both cases to go well beyond trade and in the first to be political and socio-economic 
as well as more narrowly economic.
Trade is central - South Africa's key market for manufactures beyond a narrow range of 
processed raw materials has been in its neighbours. With a trade balance that historically has 
choked off rapid growth, preserving and building on that market is crucial. Because the reality 
that export growth cannot be a one-way street with payment in hard currency (convenient as 
that would be) nor in unskilled migrant labour (which would be highly inconvenient given 
South Africa's livelihood expansion/unemployment reduction goals) there is more interest than 
previously in sourcing from, as well as selling to, the region.
Beyond trade, several other economic sectors are of interest: transport and communications, 
power, water, knowledge creation and exchange (especially agricultural), tourism promotion, 
water and water right allocation. In each, even reasonably efficient solutions require 
coordination or integration. Fortunately, in several, the probable trade balance out-turn would 
be favourable to several o f South Africa's Southern African partners.
South Africa has picked up and built on the SATCC (SADC's Transport and Communication 
Commission) concept o f transport corridors and its extension to ancillary and related 
activities in the Beira Corridor Authority case. The proposed Eastern Transvaal-Maputo 
corridor/growth pole relates transport, industry and agriculture to create a base toward 
dynamic growth in a relatively stagnant area o f South Africa and a war dislocated one of 
Mozambique.
Some o f these areas go beyond economic as does food security even if concern for them has 
economic as well as political driving forces. Water rights allocation agreements on the 
Orange and Limpopo Rivers as well as on the cluster transiting Botswana to Namibia and 
Swaziland to Mozambique is crucial to medium term water planning in a distinctly water short 
region. It poses serious problems, partly because o f prior - and often inefficient - South 
African use and because as the colonial power South Africa prevented use of Orange River 
water for irrigation in Namibia while developing it in the Northwest Cape, but even more 
because it is an absolutely and increasingly scarce resource. The political costs of
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disagreement would be high; those of acceptable agreements will not be negligible since South 
Africa (as well as several other SADC members, notably Swaziland) will need to enforce more 
efficient agricultural use (e.g. drip or sprinkler irrigation), better vegetation planning (ripping 
out exotic trees - especially eucalyptus - in some watershed areas) and enhanced waste water 
purification to restore quality and quantity flows into Swaziland/Mozambique and to avert 
similar crises in the Limpopo Basin.
Food security - one o f SADC's demonstrable success areas - is important to South Africa 
because it cannot be secure - or able to sustain exports - in a starving sub-region. Regional 
pre-planning requires South African data - especially as to possible exports commercially or 
via triangular food trade - and both early warning and food distribution (including work/food 
programmes) are areas in which exchange of information can be useful to South Africa.
Food security and water security are examples o f areas in which South Africa's broadened 
definition of security has regional implications. Traditional security concerns - military and 
political remain - but in a new context. No real regional threat to South Africa's military 
security is credible nor is South Africa committed to use its military capacity for hegemonic 
purposes in the region nor to use it unilaterally. The exercise in pre-emptive diplomacy 
backed by the visible presence o f and credible willingness to use economic and political levers 
to back it up crucial to the peaceful reversal o f the 1994 Lesotho coup was a joint one - 
especially with Zimbabwe. Security against large scale smuggling, drug trafficking, poaching 
(by land or sea) and arms running do require coordinated use o f force (or its threatening 
presence, e.g. the cooperation in catching Spanish pirate trawlers in Namibian waters) but also 
a prearranged set o f guidelines for ongoing or emergency action. Behind certain o f these 
threats to social economic, environmental and - on occasion - physical security - and especially 
that of massive migration in search of work - lie issues of extreme poverty and lack o f 
livelihood opportunities. High levels of absolute poverty anywhere in the region are a 
threat to stability and development everywhere in it. It was a hard-headed Afrikaner 
businessman who said o f Lesotho's people "If they do eat, we cannot sleep".
Beyond the immediate Southern African region, South Africa's concerns in SSA are more 
economic - and particularly trade plus limited investment - focused. Integration in a broad 
sense is not on the immediate agenda beyond participation in and, hopefully, reinvigoration of 
general continental institutions such as the ADB, ECA and the OAU and specialist ones like 
ICIPE (insect control) and the International Centre for Tropical Agricultural Research plus - 
perhaps, selective tariff and non-tariff trade barrier preferences. Globally, the potential uses o f 
African regionalism or Southern African sub-regionalism - e.g. in WTO or FAO or on the 
enterprise front in a coordinated, phased regional coal export expansion strategy do not yet 
seem to have received detailed consideration. The Southern African initiatives in respect to
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Nigeria, at the Commonwealth Conference and since, are an initial example, but to date appear 
to be one-off not part of an articulated strategy.
To date, national and enterprise concerns appear to have converged markedly. This may 
not always be the case. For example, dynamic growth of sub-regional sourcing is essential to 
dynamic growth o f South Africa exports to the sub-region. Because this is a macro concern 
and because balancing import potential lies in part in state controlled or owned sectors (e.g. 
transport, electricity) is it likely to be higher up on the South African state's priority list than 
on those o f most enterprises. How to limit such divergences by moral suasion, incentives to 
enterprises and complementary state action is a question which will probably need attention.
T r a d e  F a c il it a t io n  a n d  C l o s e r  In t e g r a t io n  R e v is it e d  
Economic coordination and integration issues fall into two broad clusters:
a. facilitation of commerce in goods and services by fiscal, monetary and licensing barrier 
removal and simplification - harmonisation of procedures and documentation;
b. policy and programme coordination or integration at sectoral (and ultimately macro) 
level aimed at mutual benefit promotion including, but not limited to, production 
(including knowledge and security) and trade.
A number o f functions - e.g. short term finance provision, export insurance, trade fairs and 
trade information collection support are on the border, but the division is basically between 
facilitation focused on trade expansion hopefully leading to production expansion by lowering 
o f state imposed barriers and production promotion through facility or incentive provision 
focused on output with trade performance one important way o f validating/marketing 
enhanced output. In Southern Africa COMESA/ECPTA and, at least nominally, SACUA 
have followed the former approach and SADCC/SADC the latter.
The two approaches are basically complementary. Without physical and policy 
coordination enhancing production, trade opportunities are likely to be limited. Without 
relatively low levels o f tax, quantitative restriction and proceeds remittability barriers, 
production potential is likely to be choked off by the throttling o f trade.
To argue in terms of either/or or of first/second among these approaches is fruitless.
Normally, both are crucial to successful integration and should proceed in parallel with exact 
relationships depending on contexts, perceptions and historical realities. Further, to attempt 
to separate the political, political economic and more purely economic is likely to be
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misleading - the "European idea" is inherently political economic and cultural. A built-in 
concern for security by unity and has always been integral, as well as parallel, to European 
economic integration efforts. In Asia, ASEAN has very gradually emerged as a strong 
economic regional grouping after a long build-up period as a rather weak policy and 
programme coordination body while its members came to know and feel comfortable with 
each other. Similarly, the anti-apartheid political leitmotif was the driving force in SADCC 
whatever its particular activity clusters and today its inheritance of common purpose and 
shared experience is one o f S ADC's greatest potential assets even if it does not relate directly 
to most economic integration programming as such nor, o f course, to relations with South 
Africa under new management.
Similarly, it is obfuscating to speak o f the first cluster as market determined and the second as 
dirigiste. Neither can function without a state frame setting role and the second’s most 
successful example - the EU - is hardly an exercise in anti-market Stalin planning as
opposed to market management and promotion.
There are however certain differences between the two approaches which may suggest 
different institutional comparative advantages and divisions o f labour. Trade facilitation 
works best over the broadest feasible area and does not per se require either massive 
harmonisation o f other economic and social policy nor great political like-mindedness. For 
example, a free trade area with current account convertibility from Pacific Russia to Greenland 
and Turkey to Norway by 2005 is a plausible objective and possibly a desirable one whereas 
extending the full panoply o f EU integration over that reach even by 2015 is an unreal one.
By the same token, the trade barrier reduction, procedural and documentation harmonisation, 
commercial clearing and trade finance measures actually focused on by EAPT A/COMES A can 
usefully cover its whole present membership and indeed could be extended to a Cape Town to 
Cairo to Douala triangle (i.e. virtually all o f non ECOWAS SSA plus Egypt).
Deeper integration of sectors and policies requires a smaller number of members to be 
practicable - especially at the start - and also a greater common feeling among them (thus 
the debate on whether Malawi should be asked to be a founding SADCC member and the 
rejection o f Zaire's de facto  application to join). This does not require static membership - 
SADC like EEC has grown (very dramatically so in regional GDP terms) and over time could 
include Zaire, Kenya, Uganda plus Rwanda and Burundi albeit only with rather more like- 
minded governance patterns in all five and serious processes of reconciliation and stabilisation 
in the last two.
From a South African perspective it is - counter intuitively - easier to fit into a second cluster 
institution, or at least one structured as SADC with common guidelines and sectoral goals but 
substantial member flexibility as well as near total member state responsibility for
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implementation. In that framework South Africa's disproportionate size is not a major 
problem nor is its relatively stronger overall (albeit not in all sub-sectors) economy. In the 
preferential to free trade area process, however, problems do arise. The expansion of SACUA 
to COMESA (or even to SADC) is not feasible on fiscal grounds, appropriate on structural 
nor likely to be saleable on political ones. In theory a front end loaded South African 
extension of tariff preferences could be negotiated with COMESA's present members, albeit 
data limitations and perceptional imbalances plus vested interests would make that very 
difficult. In practice some such approach will be needed within SADC - reviving the extant 
South Africa-Zimbabwe (and Malawi) trade preference agreements plus maintaining a mildly 
reformed SACUA, plus mirroring COMESA preferences among SADC members other than 
South Africa, is a stopgap but there a greater sense o f common purpose plus the possibility of 
clear early gains in other sectors make an agreed solution and its ongoing adjustment and 
broadening more feasible.
Both in the trade facilitation and the integrated production promotion clusters, the basis for 
selection and sequencing necessary for success is mutually perceived mutual interests. A
model can at most indicate where mutual interest potential exists and help in making it 
perceptible; it cannot serve as an architectural drawing for institutions or activities. Attempts 
to reduce all trade barriers uniformly without regard either to domestic damage and 
perceptions in some member states is a route to deadlock, reversal or de facto  dissolution just 
as is determination to include - say - a regional finance and technical assistance institution in a 
sectoral coordination package if few member states perceive any value to it. Similarly, 
attempting to replicate the present scope, powers and staff strength o f the EU in Africa is 
likely to create a mutual perception among member states that the Secretariat is an outside 
"they". That is highly counterproductive because to be successful a regional organisation 
needs to be seen as "our". Despite defects in performance of some sectoral units, the 
concentration o f SADC professional staff in programme units overseen by states has averted 
that clash and allowed a build-up o f Secretariat capacity and functions as and when member 
states perceived that to be needed to support "our" concerns.
The contention that this approach will set aside too many 'hard' sectors or programmes is not 
self-evidently true. SADC's Energy Sector fostered trans-national thinking in respect to 
electricity production and use. Its first proposals for inter-connections were marginal but 
created a dynamic o f rethinking leading to SADC's protocol toward a regional power grid. 
Similarly, once South Africa became a member, the need to face a series o f water right 
allocation issues promptly was taken up by the relevant Lesotho based sectoral unit and has 
resulted in a protocol and steps toward a negotiating process.
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K e y  Is s u e s  F o r  S o u t h  A n d  S o u t h e r n  A f r ic a
For South and Southern Africa four issues are central to continuing and strengthening the 
integration process:
1. restructuring the economic content of past economic relations as well as their 
political economic goals, because the past pattern o f exchanging manufactures for 
unskilled labour and hard currency to build a hegemonic South Africa is no longer viable, 
while at the same time seeking to incorporate socio economic and political security goals 
in the regional process;
2. broadening sectoral coverage beyond trade and transport to include energy, water 
allocation and use, knowledge creation (e.g. agricultural research), macroeconomic policy 
harmonisation, food security and security more generally, promotion o f cross-border 
'production corridors' on selected main transport axes;
3. reforming and harmonising inherited institutions - notably SACUA, SADC and 
COMESA - into mutually reinforcing patterns and developing more creative and mutually 
supportive relationships with regional enterprise and social sector groupings;
4. surmounting the special WTO and EU interaction problems of an economic 
integration grouping one of whose members is classed as (and bound to the 
requirements placed on) a developed industrial economy while the others are classed 
as developing (and in several cases least developed).
The restructuring requirements are basically in the interests of balance, mutual benefit and 
sustainability. They require substitution of South African sourcing of goods and services 
(including transport, power, tourism, natural gas, manufactures) in the region to replace hard 
currency and migrant labour as payments for its exports. This is a necessary condition - at 
least in the medium term - for sustained growth of South African regional exports. It is also 
one which can be valuable in and o f itself to South Africa because the region is a potential low 
cost supplier for a number o f goods and services while Maputo is the natural Indian Ocean 
port for the Northern PWV and Mpulunga and Walvis Bay is the logical Atlantic port for 
South Africa north o f De Aar junction.
Major transitional problems arise for South Africa and its partners in respect to migrant 
labour and to certain labour intensive manufactures - including garments, textiles, shoes 
and other leather products and furniture. In both cases the key issue is livelihoods in South 
Africa and in partners. In both, phasing is needed - gradual (preferably voluntary, e.g. on 
retirement) reduction o f contract labour employment in South Africa and gradual removal of 
protective devices limiting Southern African labour intensive manufactured goods sales to
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South Africa. When posed in these terms and seen together, the problems become less 
intractable because in the one case the jobs gained are in South Africa and in the other in 
Southern Africa and because in the migrant labour case South African trade unions have been 
protective o f all present workers not narrowly nationalistic. Therefore, both problems should 
be reviewed in the new labour sector unit in close consultation with South African unions and 
sub-commission (in the manufactures case jointly with the Trade sector unit and sub- 
commission) to work out a practicable acceptable package.
Lesotho is a special case. It has virtually no economy not totally integrated into that of the 
Rand for which it basically serves a long distance worker residential area and a nearly 
recreational zone with a supporting set o f public services, infrastructure and commerce. A 
near total economic union including free or virtually free movement o f labour within a few 
years is needed - a solution neither necessary nor practicable for Southern Africa in general. 
For example, employment build-up along the Maputo corridor, in the transport/commercial 
sector of Maputo and in the southern Mozambican tourist sector provide ways o f revitalising 
that area's war-ravaged economy while gradually reducing the historic dependence on jobs in 
the South African mining sector.
The most innovative South Affican-SADC-Southern African initiatives are in respect to 
security broadly defined. The tangles on agreement in respect to structuring should not be 
allowed to obscure the emergence (basically out of the former FLS structure in which the 
ANC was de facto  an associate member) o f the Association of Southern African States 
(including the Interstate Defence and Security Committee at Ministerial/Official level) within 
the broad SADC ambit and the definition of security including social, economic and household 
physical security as well as macro military and diplomatic aspects. In that sense the existing 
Food Security unit and programme are a portion of security albeit one not likely to be folded 
into the ASAS structure; the new labour sector unit and sub-commission are to a not 
inconsiderable extent concerned with livelihood security; the water allocational protocol and 
negotiations relate to livelihood, food and diplomatic security.
In the military security field two points are unusual. First, the definition of military threats 
includes those to democracy as evidenced both by the 1994 Ministerial Workshop on 
Democracy, Peace and Security (which drew in parliamentarians and social sector 
representatives as well as ministers and officials) and in the effective deployment o f the 
diplomacy of isolation and the threat of economic and military sanctions to reverse the 1994 
Lesotho military coup in parallel to domestic and South African social sector mobilisation and 
to continued recognition of the pre-coup government. Second, much o f the projected 
integrated use of force relates to such heads as external fish theft, smuggling, drug and arms 
trades (transit and regional market oriented) and cross-border banditry (including poaching).
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The issue o f external threats to members of the region - and especially o f responses to them 
- has apparently not been articulated concretely albeit one case may well become urgent. That 
is security (not least fiscal security) cost to Tanzania of the holocaust in Rwanda and the 
continuing instability with violence in both Rwanda and Burundi (including the consequential 
three-quarter million refugees in Tanzania). As much of the problem turns on the incompetent 
pusillanimity combined with penny-pinching of the international community, diplomatic as well 
as (or perhaps even more than) more physical regional support to Tanzania may be 
appropriate.
Security concerns are perceived as relating to reducing the causes of violence not just its 
suppression. That in a broad sense means regional development keyed to poverty 
reduction. What it means in more specific terms and how ASAS/ISDSC will relate to 
specific non-security programmatic areas in SADC is yet to be worked through.
The security area is sometimes linked to all unrecorded cross-border activities - legal, 
alegal and illegal. That is a mistake - and one SADC/ASAS seem to have avoided to 
date. Short distance seasonal border area migration and crop labour and border trade 
(especially in local goods) pose no security problems and are better regularised (or allowed to 
continue uncontrolled though preferably recorded) than suppressed. Massive currency flows 
and smuggling linked to unequally overvalued exchange rates and detailed quantitative 
restrictions cannot, in the Southern African context, be suppressed and are better handled by 
achieving more realistic exchange rates and macro external sector management. Per contra 
the arms, wildlife trophy and hard drugs trades do threaten security (not least because all are 
in practice inherently violent) and do require joint suppression.
How to handle the plethora o f unrecorded, alegal and/or illegal movements of goods, services 
and persons across borders in Southern Africa requires overall analysis and strategic planning 
not just case by case combinations o f attempted suppression and/or benign neglect. Some 
cases are so seriously harmful that effective interstate cooperation in suppression is needed: 
e.g. the drug, arms and protected wildlife trades, the use of the Maputo forex markets to 
secure hard currency for illegal activities in South Africa, the near total collapse o f customs 
collection on Mozambique's land borders. Others must be regulated - South Africa and 
Botswana cannot provide livelihoods for every unskilled worker or small scale farmer who 
would wish to seek them there, nor can other Southern African states afford to have every 
professional person attracted by South African, Botswanan or Namibian salaries emigrate. In 
these cases regulation is usually only an interim step - reducing absolute poverty and 
uncongenial work conditions (not only pay) are the basic cures. But in other cases what 
cannot be prevented is better legalised, but also recorded and analysed, so it can be 
understood, reformed, regulated, perhaps replaced, e.g. most border trade and much parallel
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market currency movement. For example, Mozambique never seriously sought to suppress 
the parallel market in Rand, knowing it to be both impossible and imprudent and its second 
exchange window approach was in large part overt legalisation to facilitate influencing 
allocation o f proceeds and improving knowledge o f foreign currency earnings.
Such a rough three way division of activities should facilitate focusing scarce resources 
(especially analytical and control personnel) on crucial tasks related to security (including 
fiscal in the case o f Mozambican Customs), to identify practicable means of control where 
total suppression is neither desirable nor attainable and to highlight causes behind the cross- 
border movement phenomena which require corrective attention. For example, a successful 
Northeast Transvaal-Maputo corridor economic development zone combined with agricultural 
rehabilitation focused on the Maputo market would make a major and lasting contribution 
through domestic livelihood creation to reducing poverty push migration from Mozambique to 
South Africa and from rural and small town areas in the Eastern Vaal to greater Johannesburg.
In s t it u t io n a l  I s s u e s
Institutionally SADC - with a growing number of protocols - is broadly adequate.
Indeed the importance o f charters and constitutions can be overrated (especially if they are 
seen as straight jackets). SADCC operated and grew for a dozen years with a statement o f 
principles and broad lines o f articulation (the Lusaka Declaration), a regularly revised 
programmatic annex and a memorandum on institutional structures and responsibilities. This 
was not, perhaps, optimal but it did facilitate flexibility and in the context o f substantial 
governmental will to proceed and a working official, ministerial, head of state decision-taking, 
monitoring and review process worked quite well. SADC has a firmer constitutional 
foundation and - via protocols - the way to articulate new priorities and areas o f ongoing 
activity.
SACUA and the Rand Monetary Area pose greater problems in principle and the medium 
term. SACUA cannot be extended to SADC, nor in the present context can it be phased out 
rapidly. On its revenue allocation aspects moderate changes (notably paying on an estimated 
current flow base not one up to two years back) can probably resolve conflicts. How to 
reduce its believed centralising impact is unclear. In the medium term, as SADC moves 
toward a free trade zone, the customs union side o f SACUA will fall away and there appears 
little inherent problem in substituting national external tariffs and single point sales taxes 
(truncated VATs) to replace revenue allocation. The RMU is less evidently non-sustainable. 
Arguably Namibia would (like Botswana) gain marginally from an independent currency, but a 
case for Lesotho or Swaziland to opt out (so long as they are not required to hold external
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assets solely or dominantly in Rand) is harder to make. Further no likely conflict arises as a 
SADC monetary union is not a short nor even a medium term plausibility.
The real problems relate to COMESA of which South Africa and Botswana are not members 
and which - for historic and personnel reasons - is on bad terms with SADC, Botswana and - 
it would appear - South Africa. Optimally COMESA would be the forum for tariff and non­
tariff barrier reduction, for commercial clearing, for harmonisation and simplification of trade 
documentation and procedures and perhaps for trade finance. For these areas its broader 
geographic reach (if South Africa were to join) would be useful and in each it has experience 
and some history o f success. SADC would continue deepening and broadening along present 
lines. For the 'Northern COMESA' the near moribund IGAD (Intergovernmental Group on 
Drought and Development) could - if desired - be resuscitated as a 'Northern SADC'.
This approach appears unacceptable to COMESA which apparently wants to engross SADC 
and to SADC which has come to perceive COMESA as inherently hostile. Fairly clearly no 
SADC member is likely to agree to a COMESA take-over, because SADC is perceived as 
more active and useful as well as more "their" organisation.
Therefore a second best proposition would be for SADC member states to withdraw 
from COMESA but also for SADC to allow all members to associate with all or selected 
members of adjacent integration groupings so long as they did not give more favourable 
treatment to these states than to fellow SADC members. Assuming SADC was able to 
negotiate trade preferences analogous to COMESA among its members other than South 
Africa and to phase in South Africa on the basis o f front end loaded South African/back end 
loaded partner preferences, this would de facto  allow Tanzania and Zimbabwe continued 
favourable access to the Kenya market and not hinder South African efforts to secure it. 
Apparently SADC's secretariat favours this trajectory. Arguably this is a more aggressive 
strategic response than it seems. If  Mauritian accession to SADC were followed by Kenyan 
and Ugandan - a not implausible medium term result - COMESA might survive but as a 
relatively moribund shell responding to SADC evolution toward interna! free trade or - if a 
genuine revolution were to restore decency, civil governance and a modicum of economic 
progress in the Sudan, became a Horn analogue to SADC.
A rather different institutional challenge is broadening participation in SADC dialogue and 
encouraging emergence o f like-minded bodies - relating to enterprise and social sector 
regional institutions. The Democracy, Peace and Security Conference may provide insights 
into the first while the new labour sector logically needs to relate to the emerging parallel (but 
independent) pattern o f regional trade union relations. SADC is inherently an 
intergovernmental structure but good governance requires it be open to exchange of 
information and dialogue with enterprise and other groupings from civil society. It has no
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need to dominate (nor to finance) such groupings at regional level, but it should seek to relate 
to and interact with them. In both aspects o f this challenge studying EEC experience - not to 
copy but to seek insights - might be profitable.
South Africa is classed by the WTO - and slightly less clearly - by the EU as a developed 
industrial economy. The deathbed conversion of the late regime to economic neo-liberalism 
resulted not merely in ready acceptance of this premature categorisation but also in 
negotiating rather rapid dismantling o f barriers and subsidies which it is not now possible to 
reverse.
This poses problems for SADC. Industrial economy levels of tariffs may well not be 
optimal for several of its other members as soon as South Africa is obligated to reach 
them. South Africa is unlikely to receive generalised system of preferences (GSP) 
treatment on exports resulting in problems for non-South African SADC exports with a 
substantial South African content securing GSP and - even more - Lome Convention 
treatment. Probably special provisions can be negotiated - especially in respect to South 
African content in (non-South African) SADC exports, but to do so will require careful 
planning, skilful negotiation and sustained pressure by SADC members as a group. One route 
- which is consistent with other probable changes - is to transform SACUA into SAFTA (free 
internal trade in domestic products but not necessarily a fully common external tariff).
B e y o n d  SADC - T o SSA
South Africa's economic concerns and interests in SSA do not end at the boundaries of 
the Southern African sub-region even if in the medium term it expands to include 
Madagascar, Kenya, Uganda and Zaire. However, beyond that radius in depth economic 
coordination, let alone integration, is unlikely for at least two decades. Even preferential trade 
prior to 2005 is rather problematic since ECOWAS has made virtually no progress on that 
front among its existing members over nearly a quarter century.
The main thrust o f South African economic involvement is and will continue to be in trade 
and in financial services provision including joint ventures. Because few African markets 
- or financial sectors - are priorities for front line global corporations (except in mining in 
which South Africa is itself in the front line) major South African enterprises view these as 
promising areas for expansion in which they can face the competition on equal terms now the 
albatross of the apartheid regime has been lifted from their necks.
As is not the case in Southern Africa (except Tanzania and perhaps Angola), their entry does 
represent a diversification o f external links and is therefore welcome. However, whether this
19
continues may depend on their translating the domestic need for affirmative action in favour of 
Black South Africans into affirmative action for Host Country Nationals - including in 
ownership - when, and as soon as, feasible. If the South African economic presence remains 
fronted entirely or almost entirely by South African faces - especially but not only white or 
brown ones - it will face increasing reservations.
For the South African state the question is what - beyond the very important automatic act of 
not being the apartheid regime - it can do to facilitate economic exchange developm ent. 
General trade promotion - including support to enterprise exploratory and initial entry 
activities - is one answer. Closer diplomatic relations including technical assistance provision 
may be a second.
More important in the medium term may be participation in continental integration 
institutions and leading a Southern African initiative to strengthen (revitalise?) them.
The key cases are the ADB, the ECA and the OAU. The ADB needs to become less o f a 
mini World Bank following the latter's evolutions and strategic shifts with a three to five year 
lag. How is an open question - especially as the ADF is dependent on foreign finance - but 
more articulated interaction with region building, more analysis linked to potential policy 
formulation and more policy formulation level technical assistance are three examples. The 
ECA has since 1990 lost all sense o f purpose and focus. There is an urgent need for its 
members to decide on their priorities for it (not the reverse) and to call for restaffing and 
reprogramming in the light o f those priorities. In the case o f the OAU, creating an economic 
and a broadly defined security analytical and advisory capacity is accepted as urgent but needs 
an initiative - e.g. by Southern Africa - backed by finance (however mobilised) to make much 
progress. In each o f these areas historic reasons - and the resentment o f smaller states to what 
they see as 'big brother' bullying - mean South Africa would be well advised to proceed 
primarily in the context o f  sub-regional initiatives and as a co, not a sole, spokesperson for 
Southern Africa - a test on which it did not perform too well in respect to Nigeria in late 1995.
Security also has dimensions beyond sub-regional. The immediate military' (or at any rate 
cross-border armed incursion) threat is to Tanzania and comes from non-SADC states to its 
West. Angola and Zambia have faced security threats from Zaire. While this is not a major 
present problem, it remains a latent one at least so long as the present personalised, dictatorial 
regime endures in Zaire.
The democracy/dictatorship aspect of security also has continental dimensions. Democracy 
died in Gambia whereas it was restored to life in Lesotho because Nigeria is not South Africa 
and ECOWAS (despite its efforts to broker and to enforce a solution in Liberia) is not AS AS. 
The presence o f totally repulsive and - except perhaps for top ruler personal interests - 
inefficient dictatorships in Nigeria, the Sudan and Zaire is bad news economically not merely
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at national level but in respect to West African and Horn economic regionalism and to any 
sustainable development process that involves basic human needs and good governance 
aspects. South Africa within the Southern African context is uniquely placed to speak out - as 
it has sought - albeit somewhat clumsily - to do on Nigeria. No West African state can take 
the lead in respect to Nigeria and Ethiopia is reluctant to do so in respect to the Sudan unless 
it can be sure o f support. Southern Africa is not vulnerable to Nigerian, Sudanese nor - if it 
stands together - to Zairian action and does not contain any government which can fairly be 
said to be a self serving clique or an abomination in human rights terms. This area is also one 
in which South African social sector bodies - probably especially trade unions and churches - 
and their regional analogues have potentially important roles.
B e y o n d  SSA - S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  S o u t h e r n  A f r i c a  a n d  t h e  W o r l d
South Africa and Southern Africa can probably have their greatest global - including 
global economic - impact through what they do and are nationally, regionally and 
within Africa. African voices are not particularly audible (or at any rate heard) 
globally primarily because of their weak and unattractive domestic bases. A Southern 
African region formulating and acting on coherent economic, socio economic and 
political economic strategies and policies which resulted in improved growth, less weak 
external account balances, improved infrastructure, better governance and more 
stability/security would have a better image and be listened to more seriously As a 
more substantial market (and source o f supply) and a more attractive area for investment it 
would receive better treatment in negotiations, more investment inflows and - probably - more 
support in respect to what were seen as truly one off, limited crises (e.g. abnormally severe 
multi year droughts).
However two more specific lines of influence/negotiation arise. International response to 
African crises - however well intentioned which is sometimes open to doubt - has typically 
been lagged, badly informed, inconsistent and partially to wholly ineffective. This 
doubtless wastes money (and the possibilities o f mutually beneficial economic exchange) for 
external actors; for afflicted Africans it wipes out livelihoods and lives.
The exceptions appear to be cases in which an African strategic frame and implementation 
capacity existed to hasten, orient, co-ordinate and utilise international response. The 1991-2 
Southern African drought (and resultant 1992-93 food dearth) and the 1993-4 drought (1994- 
95 dearth) in Ethiopia are - correctly - seen by the international community as its most 
effective responses to major African drought crises. But the underlying reason is less stressed 
- national and SADCC data, initiatives and prioritisations in Southern Africa and national in
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Ethiopia provided leadership, early warning and implementation capacity. Similarly - limited 
as its results are - ECOWAS mediation/peace brokering in Liberia has been much less 
ineffective than UN led intervention in Rwanda and Somalia and if the Tanzania led/OAU 
supported mediation efforts in Rwanda had had meaningful support from the UN (including a 
constabulary definition o f peace keeping as quieting or stamping out minor disturbances 
before they escalated out o f control) it is not unlikely the Rwanda holocaust could have been 
averted. South Africa in the Southern Africa group can attempt to respond to the need to 
alert, inform and guide international responses where and when needed.
Finally, in WTO, FAO and other global organisations the attention paid to proposals and 
negotiating positions depends on size of proponent and on quality of proposal. Southern 
Africa acting together with mutually crafted (and cross-checked) positions can do more jointly 
than severally. South Africa - with the bulk o f the region's economic size - will need to be 
central to (but to avoid seeking to dominate) efforts in that direction.
Enterprise parallels exist. For example, Southern Africa has several potential as well as 
actual coal exporters. Coordination o f production and export plans (and of related 
infrastructure creation) including timing linked to world market evolution analysis could 
strengthen the region's position in, and earnings from, the world coal market. Government 
involvement is likely to be essential because railroad and port facilities - even if largely 
financed by coal producers - do- involve states (whether as providers or as buyers o f spare 
capacity, e.g. on a Trans Kalahari and a Moatize-Ncala or Moatize-'North Beira' rail line and 
at their coastal terminal bulk ports) as do some aspects of trade and market access 
negotiation.
P r o p h e c y , P o r t e n t  o r  P r a c t ic a b l e  P o t e n t ia l ?
The preceding sketch is not a prophecy. It may very well not happen and what does happen 
will certainly diverge in detail from what is sketched.
Nor is it a portent - the scenario is a positive one. While clearly perceiving economic 
integration as only one o f a number o f tools and as one whose contribution has present limits 
and substantial time, attention and resource requirements for build-up it does not view it either 
as a dead end, as trivial or as inherently unattainable over 1995-2005 (at least in Southern 
Africa - West Africa and the Horn are much more problematic).
The record o f SADC/SADCC since its 1978-9 pre launching preparation and of South African 
involvement in Southern Africa since the elections are positive in three ways.
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First, there has been a high level of interest by a growing range of ministers and officials 
linked to growing parallel enterprise and social sector interest;
Second, there has been a willingness to plug away at details and at capturing delayed 
results linked to an eye for getting some quick, visible payoff initiatives to sustain 
interest;
Third, innovation has marked both SADC and SADCC;
a. SADCC launched the first regular aid coordination forum managed by recipients, 
responding to their priorities and able to secure sustained funding;
b. the net addition to transfers to the region may be problematic - the reallocation toward 
agreed user priorities and therefore the increase in quality o f aid is much clearer;
c. SADCC remains the only economic integration, grouping to have made food security 
a priority and to have evolved ways of working toward it (from the Lusaka Declaration 
onward) - most visibly the 1991-92 drought response;
d. whatever its limitations, the integral host state/member state central roles in sectoral 
programming and the tying of the bulk of professional personnel to implementing 
previously agreed programmes has sustained state involvement and support while having 
been consistent in a majority o f cases with dynamic programme development;
e. the broad definition of security in relation to underlying causes and to democracy and its 
application to managing and overcoming the Lesotho crisis and responding to the 
worsening Nigerian situation are both unusual and positive broadening o f normal regional 
integration themes.
If this record can be sustained - including more innovations as needed - South Africa and 
SADC can exemplify at home, sub-regionally, in SSA and globally the positive side of Pliny's 
observation - "Out o f Africa there is always something new ".
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